A Civic Aftershock Unleashed by an Earthquake

In the aftermath of the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, “citizens discovered each other, their own strength, and the superfluidity of what seemed like an omnipotent and pervasive government, and they did not let go of what they discovered,” writes Rebecca Solnit in her recently released book A Paradise Built in Hell.

Solnit’s book looks at the positive outcomes that have arisen out of some of the worst disasters of our time.

Her recounting of Mexico City’s earthquake seems particularly timely given the Swine Flu scare and drug cartel crisis that Mexico has suffered through this year.

It can be argued that the government’s response to both problems shows just how far Mexico has come since the 1985 disaster.

The Real Disaster Was Corruption. According to Solnit’s telling, the real disaster that befell Mexico City was not an earthquake, but the rampant corruption that ran through the country’s government and economic system.

The damage caused by the two-minute quake at 7:17 am on Sept. 19 was exacerbated by builders who used substandard building materials and government saftey inspectors who looked the other way, Solnit writes.

The final toll of the destruction, by Solnit’s count, included the following:

• 2,000 buildings that were irreparably damaged,
• between 10,000 and 20,000 deaths,
• 800,000 people instantly homeless, and
• 40,000 to 70,000 unemployed garment workers.

It was the government’s ineffective response to this crisis that spurred Mexican citizens to take on the task of rebuilding their lives and communities, Solnit says.

Neighbors. Survivors tell her that free cafeterias emerged in neighborhood parks. Neighbors gave each other clothes and other items.

Unemployed garment workers formed the first independent women-led union in recent Mexican history.

The scores of people who lost their homes overcame efforts to move them further away from the city by forming the Unified Coordinating Committee of Earthquake Refugees. The result was additional housing rights which allowed many of them to purchase the homes they formerly rented.

By the time life returned to normal, Mexico City’s citizens were loath to give up their new found power. The result, Solnit writes, was the election of two progressive mayors and the defeat of the PRI in 2000. While she discounts the amount of real change brought about by the PAN’s Vincente Fox, Solnit points to the end of the PRI’s reign as the beginning of a more robust two-party democratic system.